Recovered memory syndrome is a defining aspect of American culture in the late twentieth century. The debate over these forgotten and remembered memories grows exponentially each year, spawning the publication of numerous articles and books in popular and clinical psychology, philosophy, and journalism. The issue of recovered memories permeates the world of television tabloid and talk shows, is rescripted in television movies, recounted in public by Hollywood celebrities, and parodied in Doonesbury. As narratives of family trauma, sexual abuse, denial, and victimhood, these memories are centrally evocative of our time.

It was in the early 1980s that many adult women (and, to a lesser extent, some men) began remembering childhood sexual abuse of which they had no prior memories. Many of these women have retrieved memories of abuse that took place from infancy until their teenage years. Most have recovered these memories in therapy, and upon these revelations many have broken off all contact with their families.

This surge of remembering has been termed false memory syndrome by its opponents. Parents who feel they have been wrongfully accused have organized against what they consider to be false accusations and bad therapeutic practice, founding the highly visible False Memory Syndrome (FMS) Foundation in 1992. To date, there have been several high-profile trials involving recovered memory with women suing their parents and parents suing therapists. The status of recovered memories as legal evidence is increasingly tenuous, but the many conflicts that do not end up in court have fractured families that once thought they were loving, supportive, and immune to such accusations. In all these cases, there are opposing sides that offer compelling and opposite versions of the past.

The cultural phenomenon of recovered memory exposes contemporary confusion and ambivalence about family relationships, sexuality, and gender power relations. It reveals the profoundly disabling aspects of a culture of victimhood in contemporary identity politics and popular psychology. It exposes many of the disabling aspects of contemporary mainstream feminist discourse. It shows the ways in which individual memory can proliferate throughout a culture, and it demonstrates the traffic between personal and cultural memory, in particular in the context of trauma. It is, in many ways, an American story of the American family of the nation.

The cultural phenomenon of recovered memory exposes contemporary confusion and ambivalence about family relationships, sexuality, and gender power relations. It is, in many ways, an American story of the American family of the nation.

This paper takes as its point of departure that the debate over the truth and falsehood of these memories is essentially irresolvable. This means that the phenomenon of recovered memory syndrome must be examined in a larger cultural framework. Most analyses of recovered memory as a cultural phenomenon have characterized it as a sexual panic that is producing false memories, a strategy that reiterates the true/false debate. Recovered memories are directly experienced as truths, hence they create an empirical situation when they are asserted. It is precisely because recovered memory is a cultural phenomenon that all of these memories must be understood as memories. Many proponents of this debate now agree that both false memories and repressed memories are possible. Yet, all recovered memories—whether the result of experiences of abuse or not—are profoundly disruptive to fundamental concepts of American culture. If these memories are true, then the abuse of children and the denial of this abuse are profoundly disturbing in their proliferation. If they are false, then an equally disturbing identification with trauma and the survivor is rampant. For the purposes of this essay, I would like to concentrate on the cases that involve adult women recovering repressed memories of abuse. (While there are men who have recovered memories, many elements of this debate hinge on the fact that the majority are women.)

The term recovered memories, which frames this debate, marks a significant change in connotation from that of repressed memories. As defined by Freud, repression is an active process in which memories are vigilantly kept from consciousness. Yet the term recovered conjures the image of someone gathering up lost memories as if they were scattered in a field. In addition, it links recovered memory to the recovery movement of the 1980s and 1990s. With its elements of self help, twelve-step programs, addiction therapy, and the language of codependency, the recovery movement is a booming industry in American culture. Recovery movement proponents state that 96 percent of all Americans are codependent, and that child abuse is the primary reason. In this movement, however, child abuse is broadly defined to include emotional or physical abuse, distance, or disrespect. Indeed, it is synonymous with bad parenting of any kind. Furthermore, the slippage from repressed to recovered implies that remembrance is an activity that will help one recover. It also functions to taint any repressed memories with the lack of credibility awarded the more extreme elements of recovery mania.

The controversy of recovered memory is fraught with betrayal, trauma, and the dangerous terrain of the status of feminist discourse. This debate remains stuck within the paradigm of truth and falsehood despite a growing realization that the truth will not be found. While I do
not suggest that I can propose a means out of this difficult debate, I would like to resituate it. This means initially examining the cultural defenses that prevent us from thinking beyond the true/false binary of memory. Primary among these defenses are the central role that experience continues to play in the core concepts of feminism (and the subsequent moral trumping ground this produces), the equation of memory and experience, and the cultural coding of forgetting as a loss or negation of experience.

Questions of Criteria

The debate over recovered memory has raised fundamental questions about the criteria for establishing evidence of past acts and the relationship of memory to experience. In the field of psychology, memory has been the focus of a broad array of studies. However, there is considerable disagreement about whether or not these studies apply to contexts of abuse, trauma, and repression. For instance, psychologist Elizabeth Loftus has studied the changeable aspects of memory. Because of her work on the unreliability of witnesses’ memories of particular incidents, Loftus has been a favored expert witness in criminal trials and a controversial figure in the recovered memory debate. Loftus's memory studies indicate both the instability and suggestiveness of memory—the ways in which postevent information can change someone’s memory of an incident and the ease with which memories of childhood events can be suggested. However, she has been criticized for the fact that her studies cannot measure traumatic experience. For instance, critics argue that a study that successfully implants childhood memories of being lost in a shopping mall cannot even remotely be equated with experiences of long-term sexual abuse. There have been only a small number of empirical studies that examine the question of memory repression. These studies demonstrate that somewhere between 20 and 60 percent of people who now remember abuse say that there was a point in the past when they had forgotten it. However, a lack of corroboration haunts empirical studies precisely because what is being remembered (an original experience or a false memory) is contested. While these studies suggest in a partial way the complex range of responses to remembering and forgetting abuse, they also indicate the inability of empirical evidence to address the status of these memories. What could such a study be?

Under close scrutiny, potential criteria for evidence, such as corroborating witnesses, physical evidence of abuse, and believability of a story, become highly problematic. Sexual abuse yields no other witnesses, other than its participants, precisely because it is an act that takes place behind closed doors. In cases where memories have been recovered years later,
usually by women in their twenties and thirties who are remembering abuse from infancy until their teenage years, physical evidence is not possible to attain. As for the believability of an individual story, this poses perhaps the most problematic criterion. Many of these memories that seem implausible must be viewed in the larger context of abuse in which truly unbelievable acts can take place within families. As FBI Agent Kenneth Lanning wrote in his report, Investigator's Guide to Allegations of “Ritual” Child Abuse,

in 1983 and 1984, when I first began to hear stories of what sounded like satanic or occult activity in connection with allegations of sexual victimization of children (allegations that have come to be referred to most often as “ritual” child abuse), I tended to believe them. I had been dealing with bizarre, deviant behavior for many years and long since realized that almost anything is possible. Just when you think that you have heard it all, along comes another strange case.10

It is at the juncture between a story that is “true to life” and the devastating potential of “true” stories to be “false” and “false” stories “true” that this debate must be resituated. To move beyond the true/false dichotomy means to think of these memories along a continuum. Ironically, it is FBI Agent Lanning who proposes just such a model for thinking about ritual abuse, “a continuum of possible activity” (although he does so with the intent that law enforcement officials discover where along the continuum each case can be situated). I propose that these memories be understood along a continuum of cultural memory, spanning from actual experience to remembered experience, with the understanding that these locations are impossible to measure. To say that recovered memories are part of cultural memory means, among other things, that the question of their origins and their relationship to experience must necessarily be thought of as a complex mix of narrative, displacement, shared testimony, popular culture, rumor, fantasy, and collective desire. All recovered memories are part of cultural memory; even those that are not derived from specific instances of abuse are still elements of the memory landscape that we inhabit. To remember something is an experience.

Displacement and Expansion

The debate over recovered memory exposes the profound ways in which memory is perceived to be fundamental to identity and social process. While the instability of memory, its constant reconstruction, and its integration with fantasy have been widely discussed, memory is still popularly conceived as a sacred and pure text. The idea of memory storage is a sig-
nificantly comforting image, precisely because forgetting seems counter to subject formation. While the concept of repression suggests that we forget, it is also based on the idea that memory retrieval is not only possible but healing. Yet recovered memory demands that we ask: What is an experience that is not remembered? What is a memory that doesn’t need an experience?

In one of the most famous cases of recovered memory, two young women in Olympia, Washington, first accused their father, Paul Ingram, of abuse and then their mother and several other men of running a satanic cult, sacrificing babies, raping them, and forcing them to have abortions.11 Psychologist Richard Ofshe, who was hired by the prosecution, discovered in the course of his examination of Ingram the power of suggestion.12 Confronted with his daughters’ accusations, Ingram was unable to believe they were lying. Ofshe presented Ingram with a fake scenario, in which Ingram had supposedly made his girls have sex with their brother, and Ingram eventually produced a detailed description of the scene. This case demonstrates not only the suggestibility of memory but the desire to narrativize. Whose “memory” was Paul Ingram producing at that moment?

In another high-profile case, the issue is the possibility that memories of abuse can proliferate into other memories. The case of George Franklin, who was convicted of the murder of eight-year-old Susan Nason twenty years after the fact on the evidence of the recovered memories of his daughter, Eileen Franklin Lipsker, was initially held up as an example of a case in which recovered memories were proven to be verifiable. Yet this verdict is highly contested and has since been overturned.13 At the same time, there is no debate about the fact that George Franklin was an abusive father. Some critics have suggested that Lipsker’s memories of her father murdering Nason are in fact a rescripting of these other memories of abuse that were transferred onto the traumatic loss of her childhood friend.

Both of these cases point to the potential for memory to be expanded (through suggestion) and displaced (from one abusive act to another). Viewed along a continuum of memory, these are mutable narratives that can morph into new forms, new stories. In this, they are not exceptional but quite ordinary.

Traumatic Memory and Narrative Form

How does one narrate pain, in particular a pain that makes one feel abandoned in society? Many recovered memories seem elusive, needing time and work to reemerge. This has been cause for skepticism, yet fragmentation is a primary quality of traumatic memories. Until recently, research
on trauma was focused primarily on the trauma of male war veterans. It was through the work of feminists such as Judith Herman in her book *Trauma and Recovery* that the politically important connection between the collective trauma of war and the individual trauma of sexual assault and abuse was made.\(^{14}\)

The trauma/dissociation model, as developed by Pierre Janet and reiterated by contemporary psychiatrists such as Herman, is central to the recovered memory debate. Traumatic memory is depicted as “prenarrative,” or, one could argue, prerepresentational. In certain cases, this prenarrative state may manifest as a form of reenactment. This is described in Janet’s well-known case of Irene, a young woman who initially could not acknowledge her mother’s death and remained dissociated from her feelings of grief. Instead of remembering her mother’s death, she reenacted her actions of the night her mother died.\(^{15}\) Janet helped this woman to eventually “tell the story” of this traumatic night and to feel her emotions of grief and abandonment.

The work of confronting traumatic memories is thus to give them representational form and to integrate them into one’s life narrative. Herman writes, “The goal of recounting the trauma story is integration, not exorcism. . . . The fundamental premise of the psychotherapeutic work is a belief in the restorative power of truth-telling.”\(^{16}\) Testimony is the means through which this process takes place. The term *traumatic memory* is thus a kind of oxymoron; the traumatic event is not initially remembered or represented but is held at bay by dissociation and reenacted without remembering. In these theories, it is narrative integration that produces the *memory* of the traumatic event (not, for instance, the often inarticulable body memories). It is when they become full-blown narratives that these memories tell stories of blame and guilt.

This concept of healing thus heavily privileges narrative form, which in turn demands the selection of details and the shaping of story elements. Many of the memories recounted by recovered memory proponents begin as barely distinguishable fragments. Traumatic memory is often described as “wordless and static” or as a “series of still snapshots,” and depicted as an unedited film, without a script, for which, according to Herman, “the role of therapy is to provide the music and words.” Indeed, the equation of memory with cinema permeates these accounts. Therapists say to patients, “let the memory unfold before you, like you are watching a movie.”\(^{17}\) Some patients say that at first they see themselves standing and watching the scenes of abuse as if they are watching a movie. And, of course, film and television are not incidental forms of cultural memory in this story—recovered memories have been the basis of several television movies, including *Fatal Memories*, in which Shelley Long portrays Eileen Franklin Lipsker.
What is striking about many of these stories is the common narrative of memory emergence. First the subject has vague sensations and fragments of images. Then the memories become increasingly ones of abuse and fear, with unidentified figures and perpetrators. Then, finally, the abuser is recognized as the father. That the father emerges as the abuser after a time is read by critics as an inevitable oedipal outcome or by proponents as the truth that was previously too painful to confront.

The commonality of these stories has been used by both sides of the debate to prove their arguments, either as evidence of suggestibility (they are too similar to be true) or proliferation (all these people couldn’t be making this up). There is also the common narrative of the moment of confrontation: The unsuspecting parents receive a letter accusing them of heinous acts and telling them that they are not allowed to contact the accuser, their child; they respond with disbelief. Yet the act of denial has also been prescripted; to proponents of recovered memory therapy, it is not evidence of innocence but guilt. Proponents of survivors insist that all sex offenders deny their acts, and that they can do so both vehemently and convincingly. Similarly, as the act of denial is prescripted, so is the state of having no memories: “that you have no memories of abuse does not mean that you were not abused” is a common refrain. These narratives are often constructed as pregiven and inviolable, a story frame into which the rememberer is neatly inserted.18

Recovered memories are not produced in isolation. Rather, they emerge in dialogue with a therapist, or in the context of a therapy group, where testimony falls not on silence but on affirmation. This dynamic draws on the legacy of early second-wave feminism, in which women’s consciousness-raising groups allowed women to voice their concerns and struggles in a space where they felt they would not be judged or dismissed. It is also the progeny of the current preoccupation with confession in popular culture, from tabloid journalism to the public testimony of radio and television talk shows. As in any controversy, it is easy to find examples of egregious excess in prodding testimony. There are examples of therapists who construct stories in obvious ways, prodding patients on by saying, “don’t worry at this point if these are real or false, just work on remembering.” In many of these cases, by the time the memory has been prodded into coherent form, its veracity is no longer under consideration.

That memory is suggestible and that trusted therapists can have an impact on what their clients believe is not surprising. Yet one might also want to ask, why would someone be predisposed to this kind of blatant suggestion? I would like to focus not on the extreme examples of suggestion but on the larger issue raised by the role of testimony.
Memory and Testimony

The capacity of survivors to testify to their experiences of trauma has been a crucial factor in the writing of history. It is through the accounts of survivors that the scenes of genocide and atrocities throughout the world are made visible and demand response. Testimony calls the listeners of the world to conscience and provides a crucial element in social justice.

Testimony involves a constitutive relationship between a speaker and a listener. The recording of testimonies of Holocaust survivors, for instance, has been examined in terms of the role played by the interviewer, who can often prompt the telling of certain memories through their questions. Psychoanalyst Dori Laub has written that the listener is “the blank screen on which the event comes to be inscribed for the first time,” and the means through which a memory can be spoken, known, and made real. As such, he defines the listener of traumatic testimony as “a co-owner of the traumatic event,” to which they are primary witnesses.

These dynamics of testimony take on a complex set of meanings when they involve a therapist and his or her client. The therapists who work with recovered memories state that their most important role is to believe their clients. In fact, this is a critical aspect of the contract between therapist and client. Belief is often characterized as a “gift” given by the therapist to a patient that authorizes them to give voice to their pain and fears. In the case of women remembering, the question of belief is crucially tied to the history of disbelief with which women’s testimony has been received, whether in the medical profession, when symptoms and pains were dismissed, or in the professions of psychology and psychoanalysis, where their experiences were traditionally read as hysterical and evidence of fantasy.

The working through of memories between therapist and patient is a process of coauthorship. As such, it produces different kinds of truth. Psychoanalyst Donald Spence has characterized this distinction as narrative truth and historical truth. Spence notes that memories and dreams are visual, and that the process of translating these images into words is one of narrative construction. While Freud insisted that there was a “kernel of truth” in any interpretation between patient and therapist, Spence emphasizes the powerful role of narrative fit. He writes, “interpretations are persuasive . . . not because of their evidential value but because of their rhetorical appeal; conviction emerges because the fit is good, not because we have necessarily made contact with the past.”

When someone is making an effort to remember events of their childhood in the process of therapy, their therapist serves as their witness regardless of where their memories emerge. Yet by no means does this indicate that these memories are produced solely to satisfy that transactive
process. Nor does their status as collaborative narratives necessarily effect their relationship to historical truth. Indeed, one could argue that the narrative element of these memories always testifies to a certain truth. This collaborative construction of a narrative of the past is fundamental to the psychoanalytic process and has been the focus of the increasingly volatile attack on psychoanalysis that has emerged in the recovered memory debate.

**Freud’s Legacy**

Despite the fact that many proponents of recovered memory therapy are vehemently antipsychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud’s legacy haunts this debate. Freud’s theories of the unconscious, his concept of repression, and his analysis of hysteria are all underlying elements of recovered memory therapy. Some critics, such as Frederick Crews, lay blame for the contemporary crisis of recovered memory precisely at Freud’s feet.22

Crews is not alone in perceiving recovered memory therapy to be a stepchild of psychoanalysis or, as others have suggested to me, its perverse progeny and a form of degraded psychoanalysis. Indeed, the parallels between Freud’s theories and responses to his patients in turn-of-the-century Europe and the phenomenon of recovered memory therapy in late-twentieth-century American culture are striking. The debate over recovered memories reenacts many Freudian narratives, both of Freud the man and Freud the theory. These battles reflect many aspects of Freud’s rivalry with Janet, in particular the debate over the distinctions between repression and dissociation as models, and what each indicates about the relationship of memory and forgetting.

Freud referred to repression as “the keystone for the understanding of neuroses.”23 Repression defines a patient who is, both consciously and unconsciously, resistant to analysis and obstructionist to self-revelation. Indeed, repression in its most narrowly defined Freudian model seems to demand an active, scripting therapist. Perhaps the most compelling aspect of the repression model is its implication of memory storage. The notion that the unconscious is filled with repressed memories that are vigilantly held in check, away from conscious remembrance, demands an oedipal journey, a search for origins. It implies that the “true” nature of one’s self is hidden though potentially accessible, and that it must be retrieved in order to produce wholeness. Yet Freud eventually portrayed the process of repression as highly complex in terms of the question of fantasy, memory, and accuracy.

On the other hand, the dissociation model implies that dissociated memories are not subject to deterioration or rescripting. It is conspicuous
that Janet referred to these memories as operating in the “subconscious.” In a paper that attempts to retrieve Janet from Freud’s shadow, Bessel van der Kolk and Onno van der Hart argue that “dissociation reflects a horizontally layered model of the mind: when the subject does not remember a trauma, its ‘memory’ is contained in an alternate stream of consciousness, which may be subconscious or dominate consciousness, e.g. during traumatic reenactments.” Is this “horizontal” model one that can fit a woman whose memories of long-term sexual abuse have been completely forgotten for twenty years? The lack of evidence on whether or not dissociation can actually fit the narrative of total prior amnesia told by those with recovered memories has troubled this debate.

The primary element of Freud’s legacy that haunts the recovered memory debate is, of course, his discussion of the relationship of hysteria to incidents of childhood sexual abuse. This is much discussed and hotly debated territory, which I hardly need to reiterate here. It is used by anti-Freudians as an example of Freud’s hypocrisy. Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson and Judith Herman, among others, suggest that Freud initially believed that his female patients had been sexually abused, indeed that sexual abuse was the key to hysteria, and then recanted that position and attributed the hysteria to repressed fantasies because he lacked the courage to take this unpopular position.

It is precisely Freud’s rethinking of the seduction theory through the question of fantasy that is critical to understanding recovered memory and the key to resituating it out of a binary of truth and falsehood. When Freud rethought his position on the seduction theory, he wrote about his “surprise at the fact that in every case the father, not excluding my own, had to be blamed as a pervert” and his concern that “such a widespread extent of perversity toward children is, after all, not very probable.” Freud and others have noted the absence of “standards of reality” in the unconscious, testifying to the lack of criteria for distinguishing between memory and fantasy within its contents. Jean LaPlanche and J. B. Pontalis have argued that the “psychical reality” of the unconscious and fantasy defined by Freud is set apart from both material reality and the realm of psychological reality. It is not oppositional to material reality but a third coexistent realm.

Hence, fantasies can be seen as an integral and concurrent reality. However, fantasies are profoundly disruptive in a social context. Is a fantasy about being raped by one’s father as troubling as a memory of being raped? In her memoir, Dancing with Daddy, Betsy Peterson writes that she was so traumatized by writing a short story in which she imagined being molested by her father that “I wanted to believe it: I wanted not to be crazy.” Are daughters’ fantasies of abuse by their fathers more disturbing in our society than actual acts of abuse?

Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen has argued that the narratives of Freud’s
patients were never theirs, not even as fantasies: “what Freud and his fol-
lowers hid so carefully, or at least denied, is the suggested nature of those
famous ‘scenes.’” Borch-Jacobsen makes a compelling case for Freud’s
role in crafting stories of seduction and abuse, and his criticisms form part
of the contemporary rethinking of psychoanalysis. However, the possibil-
ity that these scenes came from Freud’s fantasies rather than from either
the fantasies or the experiences of his patients, in which they then partic-
ipated in a process of coauthorship, does little to resolve the larger social
implications of recovered memory. If, indeed, some of these memories are
created through suggestion, and there is plenty of testimony by “retrac-
tors” of recovered memory who now disclaim what they once remem-
bered, I would argue that the issue of cultural fantasy and memory
remains. These fantasies and memories are still shared among us, whether
produced by fathers (like Freud) or daughters, or both.

Feminism and Recovered Memory

The cultural equation of memory and experience forms one of the pri-
mary obstacles to rethinking the recovered memory debate. The limited
frame of much popular feminist discourse forms another. Recovered
memory painfully reveals how the alliance of feminism with the language
of the recovery movement has produced a kind of public feminism from
which many feminists feel profoundly alienated. For many feminists like
myself, the feminism now routinely attacked in popular debate for encour-
aging young women to identify as victims is deeply unrecognizable.
Recovered memory offers a difficult opportunity to reexamine some of
the core beliefs of feminism that are increasingly disabling to feminist
interventions. Judith Grant outlines these core concepts as “woman, expe-
rience, and personal politics.” Hence, to question the veracity of a recov-
ered memory is to question some basic tenets of mainstream U.S. femi-
nism: that there is a commonality between all women, that women are
oppressed as women, and that their experience is fundamental to their
identification as women.

These core concepts have been heavily criticized within feminism by
lesbians and women of color, who have defined them as specifically white,
straight, and middle class. They are nonetheless still dominant in main-
stream feminist discourse. In the context of recovered memory, these con-
cepts can be extended to the mandate that one must believe the experi-
ences that women have voiced, since those experiences have been ignored
and discounted by men for centuries, and that abuse of women as children
is rampant in U.S. society (some figures quoted in the recovered memory
movement are as high as one in three women).

In addition, as Janice Haaken notes, there is a “double-gendered cast”
of the recovered memory debate. The mental health profession is increasingly “feminized”; while many of the spokespeople in the debate are male, many of the practicing clinicians and experts on sexual abuse, who are increasingly under attack, are women. The FMS Foundation and other critics of recovered memory often deploy cultural stereotypes of women as vindictive destroyers of ideal families to discredit their testimony. In addition, Haaken points out that it is precisely the embrace of the dissociation model, by feminists like Judith Herman, away from a model that situated abuse in the context of patriarchal family relationships, that has disabled the recovered memory debate. The absence of consideration of the interpersonal dynamics of trauma and the failure to address the social and developmental meanings of trauma memories (by reading them only literally) have produced a simplified approach to trauma that is dangerous for women and feminism.

Mainstream feminism has not looked critically on recovered memory or satanic cults. In fact, it can be said to have embraced it. In 1993, Ms. magazine declared, “Believe It! Satanic Cult Ritual Exists!” Its cover showed a small child entangled in the coils of a snake engraved with hieroglyphs, with devil faces hissing around her with forked tongues. They and others have embraced The Courage to Heal, which has sold over 750,000 copies and is considered to be the “bible” of sexual abuse survivors (and which is called “The Courage to Hate” and “The Courage to Accuse” by its critics). Feminist psychologist Carol Tavris reviewed it and other incest survivor books in a now-notorious article in the New York Times Book Review, “Beware the Incest-Survivor Machine,” for which she was criticized as antiwoman and providing support for “molesters, rapists, pedophiles, and other misogynists.”

Among other things, Tavris criticized the vague list of questions in The Courage to Heal that supposedly offer evidence of a history of sexual abuse, which, as she put it, “nobody doesn’t fit”: “Do you feel powerless, like a victim? . . . Do you feel different from other people? . . . Do you hate yourself? . . . Do you find it hard to trust your intuition? . . . Are you afraid to succeed? . . . Do you feel you have to be perfect?” Tavris and other critics of recovered memory therapy charge that many of the women who begin this therapy start out with a list of vague reasons—they are unhappy, they feel adrift, they are searching for answers. The “discovery” that they have been molested as a child often forms the “perfect” answer.

What would it mean to construct a feminist position that did not entail belief in all recovered memories as traces of actual experiences of sexual abuse? Can we have a theory of experience that allows for the suggestibility of memory, but which does not label women as hysterics? This debate points to the disabling role experience plays in feminist epistemology. What was initially a concept of experience that provided an intervention in the politics of the personal, location, and gender has become an overriding
doctrine of popular feminist discourse. The recovered memory debate demands a rethinking of the relationship of experience to identity formation and the need to consider experience as a form of self-invention and an active social practice. For instance, in what ways are the experiences of sexual abuse in these memories the experiences of adults and not children?

At the heart of this story is the struggle of daughters and fathers, for the accusation by daughters of sexual abuse by fathers is the primary narrative of this debate. Is it evidence of the historical sense of ownership that fathers have felt over their daughters’ bodies, a proprietary sense of their role as patriarch to use their daughters for their own sexual gratification? That men have abused their children with a sense of ownership is not contested. Or, is recovered memory evidence of the struggle of daughters, one might say an oedipal struggle, to violently separate from their fathers? Why is it that so many memories of abuse begin with unidentified perpetrators that over time emerge as fathers? This fact prompted disbelief in Freud, but shouldn’t we look further?

In reviewing these stories, one cannot help asking, Is the very nature of childhood abusive to women? According to Carol Tavris, recovered memories of sexual abuse are a “brilliant figurative metaphor” for the powerlessness that women feel, the abuse they feel they have experienced as women.36 If recovered memory syndrome means that, despite having no memories, many women are willing to believe that they have been victims of abuse, then it is compelling evidence of the troubling ways in which many women still identify themselves as disempowered. In their search for wholeness, for which memories of abuse provide a certain clue, these women testify to the very incompleteness and emptiness of the present.

To read one’s unhappiness and lack of fulfillment as memories is to turn symptoms into memories. The answer that one’s unhappiness is attributable to forgotten abuse is also an answer that precludes many other responses. It shifts the focus from the potential of a social movement to rethink gender power relations to contained instances of familial abuse. As a social movement, it is profoundly depoliticizing. Tavris writes:

Contemporary incest-survivor books encourage women to incorporate the language of victimhood and survival into the sole organizing narrative of their identity. . . . Such stories soothe women temporarily while allowing everyone else to go free. That is why these stories are so popular. If the victim can fix herself, nothing has to change.37

The recovery movement thus demonstrates the ways in which the political is increasingly considered to be harmful in late twentieth-century American culture. This emphasis on individual oppression and fulfillment is also allied with the problematic contemporary preoccupation with the survivor.
Survivor Envy: The Desire for Memory

Throughout the twentieth century, survivors of trauma have been powerful cultural figures. The survivor as a figure of wisdom and moral authority emerged in the wake of World War II and now stands as a signifier of a moral standard, someone who must be listened to. More recently, through the work of people like Judith Herman, survivors of sexual abuse and rape have forced into public debate the connections between collective trauma, such as wars and genocide, and individual trauma, such as rape, assault, and sexual abuse. In addition, the current rhetoric of identity politics often emphasizes victim/survivor status. Recovered memory can be seen as an inevitable outcome of this complex legacy. In what ways has declaring oneself a survivor become synonymous with having the right to speak?

Despite the increasing identification with victim status in American culture, from the arenas of law to the context of the classroom, it remains difficult to address the romanticization of victimhood and survivor status. Much of the literature on recovered memory is insistent that survivors with recovered memories could not possibly want to relive these experiences through memory. One therapist states:

Let me tell you, I never met anybody who tried to be a survivor on purpose. There's precious little to be gained by being in this club. . . . Who would want to put themselves through this pain, or think their father did this to them? I've never seen such a confabulation in my practice.38

Others, though, have argued that there are plenty of motivations for people to identify with victim or survivor status, whether consciously or not. Law professor Martha Minow writes that “it seems odd that anyone would emphasize their victimhood, yet there are many attractions to victim status. Prime among them is sympathy.”39 She notes that other features of victimhood—“relieving responsibility, finding solidarity, cultivating emotions of compassion, and securing attention”—are evident in laws concerning antidiscrimination, hate speech, crime, and family violence. It hardly needs to be added that an embrace of victimhood is presented in television talk shows as a kind of ticket to the stage and the artificial sympathy of its audience.

The most extreme examples of the romanticization of victimhood can be found in the recovery movement. This can go so far as associating those who have experienced difficult childhoods with survivors of collective trauma. For instance, recovery specialist John Bradshaw states that adult children of alcoholics are like Holocaust survivors and suffer from posttraumatic stress disorder.40 While it is important to note that sur-
vivors of rape and sexual abuse have never been awarded the same moral authority to speak as have survivors of historical traumas, this correlation is both ludicrous and offensive.

The recovery movement has emerged in a larger social context in which social empathy is rare and social policies are increasingly draconian. The cultural romanticization of the survivor, whether in popular culture or in the context of the popular psychology industry, can be seen as a response to this lack of social concern. The capacity to render the homeless person or the welfare recipient invisible is thus contingent upon engaging with an identity status that allows oneself to feel that anger, resentment, and the right to speak seemingly afforded those who have been oppressed.

Recovered Memory as Cultural Memory

To examine the cultural defenses that keep the recovered memory debate within the limited binary of truth and falsehood also means reconfiguring the means by which we understand the relationship of individual memory to cultural memory. To acknowledge the function of memory as an inventive social practice is also to reckon with the traffic between personal and cultural memories. To pose the question, Whose memories are these? is thus not to claim that the individual recovered memories of women are fabricated but that they, like all memories, are part of an ever changing script that cannot be separated from the images that circulate within popular culture, the discourses of women and sexuality, and the debates over the status of the American family.

The families that have been accused by women with recovered memories for the most part look strikingly alike. They are mostly white, middle- to upper-middle-class nuclear families. They are often presented in documentaries as perfect emblems of the American dream, their rituals of birthdays and Christmases captured on innumerable reels of Super-8 film. Each one is presented as formerly believing in its perfection, goodness, and coherence as a family unit.

What is the nature of this American family? What does it mean for so many families to be locked in this story, not of absentee, distracted parents, conflict avoidance, casual sibling cruelty, or unfulfilled emotional needs, but of rape, forced oral sex, threats of mutilation, and, finally, gang rape and human sacrifice. Many of these families have had to confess their lack of perfection—yes, I was an angry mother, yes, I was withholding with my children, yes, I may have done a few things that could be misinterpreted as crossing boundaries, after all, I came of age in the 1960s; it’s true I was an alcoholic. But they all proclaim they never sexually
The recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse and satanic cult ritual both respond to and produce cultural memory and concepts of nationhood. Through the dissemination of these stories in popular psychology books, TV talk shows, television movies, novels, memoirs, and Internet discussion groups, individual memories both become cultural remembrances and are permeated with them.

In particular, the debate over satanic cults and ritual abuse reveals the ways in which individual and cultural memory converge. While the stories of satanic cults may seem easy to dismiss because of their implausible elements, it would be a mistake to underestimate their social impact. As FBI agent Lanning has noted, many so-called unbelievable crimes are enacted all the time. Belief in the existence of satanic cults is widespread in American society, and social workers, medical professionals, and law enforcement officials have been trained in many parts of the country to believe in and search for evidence of these crimes. However, in 1992 Lanning stated that for at least eight years American law enforcement has been aggressively investigating the allegations of victims of ritual abuse. There is little or no evidence for the portion of their allegations that deals with large-scale baby breeding, human sacrifice, and organized satanic conspiracies. Now it is up to the mental health professionals, not law enforcement, to explain why victims are alleging things that don’t seem to have happened.

Satanic cult belief increased in the United States with the publication in 1980 of the book *Michelle Remembers,* in which Michelle Smith describes her experience in a satanic cult; the book contains graphic descriptions of rituals and an intercession by Jesus Christ. That same year, rumors began to circulate that Procter and Gamble was promoting satanism through elements of its logo (these elements have since been removed). Throughout the 1980s there were several television specials on “devil worshipers,” the most well-known of which was a Geraldo Rivera special titled “Devil Worship,” which aired in 1988. Each of these has affected the proliferation of similar stories and has prompted new memories. Perhaps it is not incidental that Freud was interested in the question of witch-hunting and devil worship, and that, a century ago, he decided that his patients were (coincidentally) having similar experiences.

The cultural memory that feeds the belief in satanic cults can be charted as well through certain events of twentieth-century history. Satanic cult imagery is derived from many sources, which are imbued with the paranoid tone of conspiracy cultures. There are many enemies...
here: the cults are said to have learned their brainwashing (and memory-blocking) techniques from Nazi scientists secretly brought to the United States by the CIA. While many of these narratives are standard conspiracy theory interweavings, in the context of recovered memory syndrome they converge in particularly consequential ways. These are specifically gendered images: rape, forced abortion, electrodes attached to vaginas, dark pits with snakes and human body parts, and the ritualistic murder of newborn infants, who are conceived from rape and whose sole purpose is to be sacrificed to Satan.

These indicate another highly problematic source for the cultural memory of satanic cults: the imagery of the antiabortion movement. The babies that are conceived only to be sacrificed, the endless imagery of the blood of the newborn, the dismembered infants—these are images that have permeated American culture since the first photographs of a fetus were produced in 1965. They form a part of cultural memory and haunt the subconscious of young women who may be plagued by guilt for many reasons. Indeed, it is precisely over the issue of fetuses conceived from incest and rape (like those imaged in satanic cults) that the abortion debate now hinges. The fetus has become a powerful figure of endangerment in twentieth-century American culture. The babies who form a central aspect of satanic cult memories, and of whom no physical evidence has ever been produced, stand in for the abused child (the inner child), who figuratively represents adult unhappiness and lack of fulfillment. The family of satanic cults is, in many ways, the family of the nation, at war over who owns women’s bodies.

Cultural Forgetting

Perhaps the most powerful cultural defense that has stymied the recovered memory debate is the prevalent notion of forgetting as a form of illness, a loss of self, and a threat to subjectivity. However, one way to understand recovered memory syndrome as a cultural and national phenomenon is not to see it simply as memory but rather as a form of cultural forgetting. The equation of memory with production and forgetting with negation has limited this debate in profound ways. A central element that binds these stories together is not their remembering but the fact that these memories were forgotten. How, one wants to ask, have so many people repressed these memories? And, why are people so easily convinced that they (and, by extension, the nation) have forgotten? Perhaps we should be asking: What does the act of forgetting produce? What lack is it contingent upon?

The fascination with forgetting in the cold war culture of the 1950s
permeates these stories. Nineteen-fifties science fiction portrayed communist identity as a forgetting of the past. The people who forgot who they were in *The Invasion of the Body Snatchers* were earlier versions of the high priestesses of satanic cults who have been programmed to not remember their brutal acts.

Yet the fears enacted in 1950s images of brainwashing and CIA experiments cannot be dismissed simply as cultural paranoia. The power of the narrative of forgetting is precisely what it indicates about subjectivity. For someone to become convinced that they have forgotten crucial experiences of their past is for them to open their subjectivity to profound disrupture. Survivors of trauma often state that they are not the same people that they were before their traumatic experience, implying that critical aspects of their former selves are no longer intact—whatever they were has been forgotten.47

The forgetting that precedes memory recovery allows for a search for origins and enables oedipal narratives to emerge. Remembering becomes a process of achieving closer proximity to wholeness, of erasing forgetting. Thus, the positioning of memory as a process through which origins are retrieved means positing forgetting as an act of misrecognition. Indeed, it can be said that Oedipus had amnesia, that he had forgotten the essence of his mother when he did not recognize her and set his sad tale into motion. His capacity to forget blinds Oedipus to his origins, and this seals his tragic fate.

Perhaps this is where Freud led us astray, with the narrative power of the oedipal story. Forgetting is not absence or misrecognition in this debate but presence. Recovered memory designates subjectivities that are constituted through forgetting as much as through remembering. This forces us to examine how forgetting is a highly constitutive element of identity and a primary means through which subjectivity is shaped and produced.

Ultimately, the debate over recovered memories exposes the fetishizing and privileging of memory that is the underlying assumption of both psychoanalysis, trauma therapy, and recovered memory therapy. In the case of recovered memories that do not promote healing but rather increase pain and isolation, one has to question the tenet that remembering is equivalent to healing. One of the most striking aspects of many stories of recovered memory is the way in which the memories grow (from vague feelings to suspicions of abuse, from unidentified figures to fathers, from a memory of a touch to satanic rituals of sacrifice and cannibalism) and become, finally, the central activity of someone’s life. Unlike the model of repression, where the act of remembering eliminates the hysterical symptoms, or the model of dissociation, where the integration of the memory into narrative allows the subject to deal with the trauma, many of
these memories take over lives and leave room for nothing else. They are tyrannical. In some of these cases, the memory itself is the sole source of trauma.

In an extensive analysis of the history of "traumatic cures," Ruth Leys criticizes Herman, van der Kolk, and van der Hart for their embrace of a simplistic Janet model of traumatic memory (in which the memory is reenacted) versus narrative memory (in which the story of the trauma can be told). This is precisely because their deployment of Janet elides the aspects of his methodology that involved helping the patient to forget. She writes:

For Herman and for the modern recovery movement generally, even if the victim of trauma could be cured without obtaining historical insight into the origins of his or her distress, such a cure would not be morally acceptable. Rather the victim must be helped to speak the horrifying truth of the past—to "speak of the unspeakable"—because telling that truth has not merely a personal therapeutic but a public or collective value as well.48

The collective sharing of abusive narrative is seen by these theorists as a moral imperative, even at the expense of the individual. Leys goes on to note the ways in which, even in the case of the now-famous Irene, Janet's work depended on a combination of "assimilation and liquidation" of the memory, aspects of his techniques that he himself obscured and that contemporary proponents of the trauma/dissociation model have distorted.

Janet often replaced patients' traumatic memories with screen memories. For instance, for a patient with hysterical symptoms who had been traumatized by sleeping next to a girl with a diseased face, he used hypnosis to replace the memory with the image of a girl with a beautiful face. As Ian Hacking writes:

Janet was flexible and pragmatic, while it was Freud who was the dedicated and rather rigid theoretician in the spirit of the Enlightenment. . . . In the matter of lost and recovered memories, we are heirs of Freud and Janet. One lived for Truth, and quite possibly deluded himself a good deal of the time and even knew he was being deluded. The other, a far more honorable man, helped his patients by lying to them, and did not fool himself that he was doing anything else.49

Janet's "pragmatic" approach, which combined both integration and erasure, addresses the problematic definition of memory as truth telling and the role of confession in both psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. It raises the important question: when is it better to forget?

To resituate the recovered memory debate outside of a binary of truth and falsehood, of memories as fantasies versus memories as recep-
tacles of experiences, we must begin by examining the long-standing equation of memory with healing, whether as the truth narrative of the individual or the cultural healing of collective testimony. Memory needs to be defetishized and forgetting undemonized. This means understanding all recovered memories, regardless of their foundation in original experience, as both memories and experiences. It also means recognizing that empirical evidence will not provide answers to this phenomenon, and that we must consider the cultural aspects of these memories—the ways in which they both permeate and are permeated by cultural images. Both Spence's concept of narrative truth and LaPlanche and Pontalis's notion of psychical reality provide models for thinking about memories as concurrent realities.

All recovered memories exist within a continuum of cultural memory. All are experiences that speak to contemporary tensions and trauma, a cultural climate of disempowerment, and a lack of political will. They demand that we examine the relationship of memory to experience by asking these questions: What is an experience that we cannot remember? What is a memory that does not need an experience? These memories belong to all of us. What we can learn from them will not come from ascribing them falsehood, but rather from examining the abuse they attest to, the fears they give voice to, and the desires they fulfill.

Notes

I am very grateful to participants of the seminar “Cultural Memory and the Present” at the Humanities Research Institute of Dartmouth College for their comments on previous drafts of this essay, in particular to Marianne Hirsch, Mieke Bal, Susan Brison, and Lessie Jo Frasier, and to Jonathan Crewe, Leo Spitzer, Ernst van Alphen, Irene Kacandes, Jane Bellamy, Melissa Zeiger, Carol Bardenstein, Ann Burlein, and Mary Kelley. Thanks to Lauren Berlant and Toby Miller for providing critical feedback on a later draft.

1. The FMS Foundation has been effective in disseminating information that has helped lawyers argue against the use of recovered memories in legal cases. However, it is also an organization that offers easy refuge for anyone accused of sexual abuse.

2. Cases of therapists being sued include the successful suit by Gary Ramona against his daughter Holly's therapists Marche Isabella and Richard Rose for what he contended was false memory implantation of sexual abuse by him, an accusation he said cost him his family and his job, and the successful suit by Patricia Burgus against two doctors, including well-known psychiatrist Bennet Braun, and a Chicago hospital for her treatment for recovered memories and the hospitalization of her children. See Douglas Suit, “Verdict Heats up Memory Debate,” Los Angeles Times, 22 May 1994, A3; Ofra Bikel's PBS documentary Secrets of Satan, 1995; and Pam Belluck, “Memory Therapy” Leads to a Lawsuit and Big Settlement,” New York Times, 6 November 1997, A1, A10.

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3. Here, I would distinguish my argument from that of Elaine Showalter, who in her book *Hystories* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997) argues that recovered memory, like Gulf War syndrome, chronic fatigue syndrome, and other contemporary illnesses, is evidence of hysteria. I do not agree with Showalter’s analysis that all recovered memories should be read either as false or hysterical.


5. The percentage of recovered memories that involves accusations of satanic abuse is impossible to ascertain. In a survey of members of the American Psychological Association, 12 percent stated that they treat ritual abuse cases. See Daniel Schacter, *Searching for Memory: The Brain, the Mind, and the Past* (New York: Basic, 1996), 268. However, therapists in the United States are not required to have professional degrees or licenses, and many do not belong to professional organizations.


9. See Harrison G. Pope, Jr. and James Hudson, “Can Memories of Childhood Sexual Abuse Be Repressed?” *Psychological Medicine* 25 (1995): 121–26. One study that is often cited as confirming repression was conducted by Linda Meyer Williams, in which she interviewed 129 women with previously documented histories of abuse, and concluded that 38 percent did not remember abuse that had taken place seventeen years earlier. Her study has been criticized at a number of levels, including the fact that it did not determine whether or not the abuse was forgotten or simply unreported in the interviews. See Linda Meyer Williams, “Recall of Childhood Trauma: A Prospective Study of Women’s Memories of Child Sexual Abuse,” *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology* 62, no. 6 (1994): 167–76, and “Recovered Memories of Abuse in Women with Documented Childhood Sexual Victimization Histories,” *Journal of Traumatic Stress* 8 (1995): 649–74; and Pope and Hudson, “Can Memories of Childhood,” 124–25. In a later study, Williams asked those women who remembered the abuse if they had ever forgotten it, and 16 percent said yes, although most said they forgot years after the abuse took place, not immediately (Schacter, *Searching for Memory*, 261).


11. This case was written about by Lawrence Wright in *Remembering Satan: A Case of Recovered Memory and the Shattering of an American Family* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994).


13. The Franklin case was overturned in November 1995, and in July 1996 Franklin was released when prosecutors decided they did not have enough evi-

Memory researchers Elizabeth Loftus and Richard Ofshe and psychiatrist Lenore Terr have all hotly debated this case. See Lenore Terr, Unchained Memories: True Stories of Traumatic Memories, Lost and Found (New York: Basic, 1994); Ofshe and Watters, Making Monsters, 253–72; and Loftus and Ketcham, The Myth of Repressed Memory, chap. 6.

15. This case is described at length in Bessel van der Kolk and Onno van der Hart, “The Intrusive Past: The Flexibility of Memory and the Engraving of Trauma,” in Trauma: Explorations in Memory, ed. Cathy Caruth (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 158–82.
16. Herman, Trauma and Recovery, 181.
17. This is documented in a filmed therapy session in Ofra Bikel’s PBS documentary, Divided Memories (1995). The Herman quote is from ibid., 175.
18. Mark Pendergrast’s book, Victims of Memory: Incest Accusations and Shattered Lives (Hinesburg, Vt.: Upper Access, 1995) documents many of these stories through interviews with survivors and retractors. Pendergrast was prompted to write the book when he was accused of incest by both of his daughters who had recovered memories.
22. Crews situated himself as a key figure in this debate when he published two lengthy articles in the New York Review of Books in November and December 1994, in which he criticized the recovered memory movement and launched into a full-blown attack on Freud’s integrity, all of which prompted a lengthy exchange of letters. Crews’s articles and the letter exchange were then republished in a book, Memory Wars: Freud’s Legacy in Dispute (New York: New York Review of Books, 1995).
32. Ibid., 1080–81.
36. Tavris, qtd. in the documentary Divided Memories.
38. Qtd. in Pendergrast, Victims of Memory, 210.
41. For an analysis of the ways in which belief in satanic cults became officially sanctioned through these networks see Nathan and Snedeker, Satan’s Silence, esp. chap. 1.
43. Michelle Smith and Lawrence Pazder, Michelle Remembers (New York: Pocket, 1980).
44. See Jeffrey Victor, Satanic Panic: The Creation of a Contemporary Legend (Chicago: Open Court, 1993), for an examination of the role of rumor in creating belief in satanic cults. Richard Ofshe also discusses the “contamination effect” of these stories in Making Monsters, chap. 11.
45. Borch-Jacobsen, “Neurotica,” 36. He argues that this is another example of Freud’s power of suggestion with his patients.
46. See Pendergrast, Victims of Memory, 187–94.